<p style="text-align:center">**Society for Applied Philosophy**</p>

<p style="text-align:center">**Annual Conference 2024**</p>

<p style="text-align:center">St Anne's College, University of Oxford, 28-30 June</p>

<p style="text-align:center">**Abstracts**</p>

- **Concurrent Session Abstracts** (arranged alphabetically by author surname)

- **Panel Session Abstracts** (follow at the end)

Concurrent Sessions

Aird, Rory (University of Glasgow)

On the perils of engaging

[**Keywords**: *social epistemology; engaging; epistemic duties; objecting; misinformation*]

Recent work in social epistemology has discussed our obligations to engage with challenges to our beliefs, particularly with reference to controversial false assertions such as "climate change isn't real", "the Holocaust is a hoax", or "Covid vaccines are deadly". Per this literature, one gets the sense that, if the engager is sufficiently closed-minded so as not to risk losing their own knowledge and any threats of epistemic injustice are accounted for, we have exhausted the ways in which engaging with or objecting to such controversial false assertions can go wrong. All that's left now is either the engaged changes their mind, or they maintain their false belief – and in the latter case nothing has been lost anyway. In this paper, I show that there are in fact a variety of ways that such a discussion can go, where, for example, an engager can essentially "lose" the engagement, and I argue that this has wide-ranging negative epistemic effects not even primarily on the engager and the engaged but rather third-party observers and society at large. Moreover, the epistemic position prior to engaging is such that it's very difficult for a potential engager to know how such a discussion might go, meaning that even the mere potential of a catastrophic engagement threatens to overwhelm any potential benefits that might be garnered in the good situation. I demonstrate that this discovery has a myriad of both theoretical and practical upshots when it comes to engaging with controversial false assertions and our obligations therein.

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An, Dong (Zhejiang University)

Artificial Reactive Attitudes

[**Keywords**: *AI; Moral Responsibility; Reactive Attitudes; Receiving & Expressing Attitudes*]

On the issue about whether AIs can be moral agents, scholars have mainly approached from the perspectives of consciousness and intentionality (Chalmers, 1997; Johnston, 2006; Searle, 1992; Sparrow, 2007) or from various functional substitutes of these faculties (Coeckelbergh, 2010, 2020; Floridi & Sanders, 2004; Himma, 2009). Nicholas Smith and Darby Vickers are among the few who explore the implication of the reactive attitude approach to artificial intelligence (Smith & Vickers, 2021). They propose two conditions that future AIs must meet to qualify as responsible moral agents in the Strawsonian framework. First, the "moral community is disposed to respond to the AI with interpersonal reactive attitudes". Second, the AI "in fact has the statistically ordinary core capacities in the way that the rest of the members of the moral community in question generally do". I argue that these two criteria are unsatisfactory. On the one hand, it is informative. On the other hand, there are

counterexamples. Instead, I propose that we shift the focus by regarding AIs as expressers of reactive attitudes rather than receivers of them. This shift exploits the Strawsonian idea that our moral responsibility practice is within a shared moral community, where the reciprocal and mutual exchange of reactive attitudes takes place. Furthermore, I argue that the capacities required as a receiver of reactive attitudes are the very same capacities required as an expresser of these attitudes. Using this reverse methodology, the question becomes whether AIs can be expressers of reactive attitudes. Since reactive attitudes are largely emotions, the question is then whether they can have certain emotions. Drawing resources from philosophy and psychology of emotions as well as from research in affective computing, I argue that they can. The upshot is that it is possible for AIs to possess and express reactive attitudes. Accordingly, AIs can have the capacities to exchange reactive attitudes with humans. This makes them a part of the shared moral community and thus morally responsible agents.

Berkey, Brian (University of Pennsylvania**)** and **Maheshwari, Kritika** *(*Delft University of Technology)

The Ethics of Partner Hiring in Academia

[**Keywords**: *Academia; Job Market; Partner Hiring; Relationships*]

Partner hiring is fairly widespread in universities in certain countries, perhaps most notably the United States. In typical cases, a department that has offered a job to a candidate either offers a job to that candidate's partner or spouse as well, or arranges for the partner to be offered a job in another department at the university. In other cases, partner hires are offered as a means to retain a faculty member who may otherwise leave for a job at a different university.

Most commonly, partner hiring policies are defended by suggesting that they are often necessary to ensure that a department's top-choice candidate accepts a job offer, or to retain a faculty member that a department does not want to lose. In addition, the practice is sometimes defended on the grounds that it is responsive to the employment needs of dual-career couples, and/or that it makes academia more family-friendly, and/or that it helps increase the number of women who are hired and remain in academia.

In this paper, we consider whether we ought to endorse the practice of partner hiring in academia. We focus on the question of whether a set of norms roughly like those in place in the United States, which treat the practice as entirely legitimate, are preferable, ethically speaking, to having a generally accepted norm against the practice, such that partner hires do not occur anywhere. We argue that there are a number of underappreciated reasons that count against partner hiring. Our tentative conclusion is that the force of these reasons is sufficient to outweigh the reasons on the other side, so that all things considered we ought to oppose the practice and support the development of norms against it.

Betzler, Monika (LMU Munich) and **Löschke, Jörg** (University of Zurich)

Should I Stay or Should I Go? Why Breaking Up is Hard To Do

[**Keywords**: *personal relationships; break-up; parity; transformative choice; practical identity;*]

Deciding to leave a committed long-term romantic relationship is one of the most difficult decisions that humans can make in their lives, as empirical research suggests. Why is this decision so difficult? In this talk, we argue that this is not merely because it is difficult to weigh the reasons for or against, or because breaking up is a transformative choice, or because committed relationships have a certain affirmation dynamic, but because the agent's rational basis is fundamentally shaken. Our practical identities make reasons to act (or feel) available to us, and romantic relationships are an important part of our practical identities. This means that when an agent doubts her relationship, the agent doubts a fundamental part of her identity, and therefore a fundamental part of what makes reasons salient and available to her. This means that the agent becomes unsure about the practical reasons she actually has; thus, the problem is not only that the agent does not know how to weigh reasons for and against staying in the relationship – she does not even know which reasons to weigh against one

another. In a sense, then, asking the question whether one should stay or leave already shows that the rational basis for answering the question is undermined. We end the talk by pointing out some implications of this account, as it might illustrate a deep tension within practical reason: on the one hand, practical reason tells us to realize important goods such as romantic love, but at the same time, practical reason tells us not to undermine the conditions for making rational choices, and these two principles can conflict with one another.

Boot, Eric (Amsterdam Law School), and **Bernstein, Justin** (Vrije University Amsterdam)

On Roles and Whistleblowing Lawyers – Taking Role Morality (Not Too) Seriously

[**Keywords**: *role morality; legal ethics; confidentiality; rule consequentialism; democratic theory*]

In many jurisdictions, lawyers' obligation of confidentiality is nearly absolute. Many in the profession hold it to be sacrosanct and an integral part of their professional ethics. Yet, this practice can also produce undesirable outcomes. With every scandal -- Enron, News International phone hacking, Volkswagen emissions -- the public wonders why the lawyers did not disclose the witnessed wrongdoing. Lawyers justify their silence by appealing to confidentiality. The standard position in the profession is that the public interest in bringing out the truth of the matter must defer to the public interest in everyone being able to seek legal advice freely and without fear for disclosure. But one can imagine cases in which this seems unconvincing, cases in which it would be best, all things considered, to blow the whistle. Our main question, in general terms, is thus the following: If we accept role ethics carries normative weight, in what circumstances (if any) can one justify deviating from it? Applied to lawyers' obligation of confidentiality: In what circumstances (if any) can we justify disclosures of clients' confidences? To answer these questions, we will proceed in the following manner: First, we will clarify our understanding of the relation between role morality and ordinary morality by way of critically discussing three dominant views of this relation. Second, we will consider three especially convincing justifications of lawyers' obligation of confidentiality as well as the limits of those justifications.

Bowen, Joseph (University of Leeds) and **Goodrich, James** (UW-Madison)

Defending the Future

[**Keywords**: *Liability; Defensive Harm; Non-Identity Problem; Rights.*]

When someone is liable to be harmed, we don't wrong them by harming them. When and why does someone become liable? Most philosophers agree that someone becomes liable only if, and because, they would otherwise wrong someone. This Dogma, as we call it, is inconsistent with two other plausible claims about the ethics of self-defense.

Let's say an action is "identity-affecting" when it impacts who will come into existence. We think it's plausible that someone can be liable in virtue of a purely identity-affecting action. (Call this claim Non-Identity Liability.) Suppose that Alma can Deplete or Conserve. If Alma Depletes, the quality of life over the next century will be slightly higher than it would be if she Conserves. However, in several centuries, quality of life will be much lower, but still worth living, than it would be if Alma Conserves. Those who would exist several centuries later in each outcome would be different. Alma's choice thus affects who will come into existence. We think it's plausible that Alma wouldn't be wronged by our harming her to some degree, if that would prevent her choice to Deplete from resulting in resource depletion. This suggests she's liable to be harmed. But we also think Alma's choice to deplete resources doesn't wrong anyone. (Call this claim No Wronging.)

The Dogma, Non-Identity Liability, and No Wronging are inconsistent. If Alma wrongs no one, and to be liable one needs to wrong someone, Alma cannot be liable. Of the three claims, we argue the Dogma ought to go. We suggest a claim that could take its place at the heart of theories of self-defense but conclude that this also has problems.

Brake, Elizabeth (Rice University)

Intimate Partner Violence and Prison Abolition

[**Keywords**: *domestic violence, prison abolition, feminism, criminal law, racial justice*]

Recently, arguments for prison abolition have been marshalled against the criminalization of intimate partner violence. I follow Tommie Shelby in holding that prison abolitionist arguments do not show that all imprisonment is unjust. However, I argue that such arguments, applied to intimate partner violence, have unappreciated implications for an array of legal institutions. An assessment of these arguments prompts an examination of what protecting basic security requires of legal institutions.

It has been an achievement of feminist legal reform that assaults within marriage and intimate relationships are now treated as crimes. Compared with previous legal regimes, criminalization recognizes the equal status of victims of such violence, the majority being women. But recent criticisms of 'carceral feminism', emerging from prison abolitionism, question the criminalization of intimate partner violence. On this view, feminists have wrongly turned to criminal law to protect women, because its enforcement often involves violence against women, and men, of color. Further, criminal penalties are disproportionately enforced against people of color, and they have unintended harmful effects on women, children, and their communities.

To these arguments, I add the point that the context of intimate partner violence raises a distinctive set of problems for criminalization. Again, this does not entail that society cannot imprison, as a matter of self-defense, those who commit violence. But it suggests a broader point about the state's role in protecting security of the person. The special circumstances of intimate partner violence entail that protecting basic security requires measures outside criminal law, such as revising marriage and family law. Protection of basic security extends to the framing of legal institutions. But the abolitionist arguments suggest, further, that this framing must consider the security of potential victims of intimate partner violence along with potential victims of police violence.

Brandt, Reuven (UC San Diego)

Procreative Obligations and the Directed Duty of Care

[**Keywords**: *harm, procreative obligations, reproduction, special obligations, parenthood*]

We have strong intuitions that procreators have weighty obligations towards their offspring. These obligations go beyond merely ensuring that their offspring have lives that contain more good than bad. I call this intuition the 'weighty obligations view'. Despite its intuitive appeal, accounting for the weighty obligations view has been elusive. Existing attempts that ground the weighty obligations view in compensation for harm collapse into anti-natalism and/or also fail to account for the scope of procreative obligations. I offer a novel defence of the weighty obligations view that grounds procreative obligations in a more general but under-theorized moral duty – what I call the directed duty of care. The directed duty of care is the duty to prevent local decreases in wellbeing (what I call injury), even when doing so is not necessary to prevent overall harm. After arguing that we ought to accept the directed duty of care, I further show that the duty is made weightier when the action that risks causing injury is done to advance the interests of another as opposed to prevent a harm. Since bringing an individual into existence at best advances their interests, and certainly does not prevent that individual from suffering a harm, procreation is on the weightier end of the spectrum. Procreators thus have a weighty obligation to prevent their offspring from suffering injury even when preventing injury is not necessary to ensure that offspring's lives contain more good than bad.

Brione, Rebecca (King's College London)

Refusal and uptake: The discomfort of reliance on one's hearers

[**Keywords**: *Speech act theory; sexual ethics; bioethics; refusal; agency*]

We all want to do things with our words; to be able to perform actions that constitute normative changes in the world. Nowhere is this more important than when we seek to use our words to grant or

deny permission to others to touch, penetrate or otherwise interfere with our bodies. An ongoing debate in applied speech act theory is whether women need to secure their hearer's uptake in order to successfully refuse sex or other intimate touching. Bianchi's recent (2023) account of illocutionary success argues that a hearer's uptake is not required for normative changes to be constituted. She argues that so long as speakers make their illocutionary intent adequately manifest and public, they succeed in their speech act even if the actual hearer fails to recognise what they are doing with their words. To require hearer-uptake is to leave speakers at the mercy of their hearers' biases, prejudices and inattention.

In this paper, I argue against Bianchi's intuitively attractive position. I show that it lacks the resources to differentiate between different types of speech-act-related ethical wrongings which occur in cases of (attempted, or for Bianchi, actual) refusal, and pushes explanatory problems downstream. I show that uptake-required accounts can better account for these.

I then present my own positive account of the conditions for a successful illocutionary act of refusal. I differentiate between full illocutionary success, partial success and failure, avoiding a claim that the speaker who has 'done everything right' but failed to secure hearer-uptake has done nothing at all with her words. I show how my account is better able to differentiate between ethically relevant wrongs in cases where uptake fails, and better responds to practical concerns about how to improve speakers' agency, even if it leaves us with the discomfort of being reliant on our hearers.

Casalia, Joaquin (University of Oxford)

Disabling Rights

[**Keywords**: *Jurisprudence; Ethics; Epistemology of Testimony*]

In this paper, I offer a novel account of the value of rights. I argue, contrary to what common belief shows, that rights can be intrinsically disvaluable for their holders. More precisely, I believe that some rights can disable their holders from constituting our most valuable relationships. I call these rights, disabling rights. In order to see this normative landscape correctly, I endorse, with specific tweaks, an account of the value of obligations that I call the liberated view of obligations. This is understood as the claim that obligations are intrinsically valuable by virtue of constituting relationships. I will suggest that not only obligations are essential for the constitution of valuable legal relationships, but also that holding a right can be an obstacle to these. Thus, disabling rights are intrinsically disvaluable for their holders.

Chalson, Shalom (Australian National University)

The Distinctiveness of Discrimination

[**Keywords**: *discrimination; distinctive wrong; conceptual analysis; prejudice; hate crimes;*]

What would it mean for wrongful discrimination to be morally distinctive? Call the claim that something is morally distinctive a distinctiveness claim. There are two distinctiveness claims one could make. One, wrongful discrimination is a special type of moral phenomena, distinct from nearby types of moral phenomena, such as prejudice or hate crimes. Two, any one act of wrongful discrimination involves a special kind of wrong, like demeaning or a basic disrespect, distinct from wrongs brought about by other sorts of morally objectionable acts. I argue in favour of the first, and against the second. I ultimately leave open that (i) discrimination is wrong for any one of a number of reasons and (ii) discrimination's wrongs are shared with nearby categories of moral phenomena.

Clark, Matt (University of Leeds)

What Trustworthiness Is and Why it Matters To Us: The Social Vulnerabilities Account

[**Keywords**: *Trust; Trustworthiness; Vulnerability; Pluralism;*]

Trust matters to us. Generally, things go better for us if we can live lives where we can trust more easily and where such trust is well-placed. Yet, the nature of trust and trustworthiness remains unclear with existing accounts diverging and subject to everyday counterexample.

What are trust and trustworthiness? In this paper, I present a new account. I argue that "trustworthiness" picks out a feature of an agent that (1) reduces the vulnerability that we face in interacting with her, and (2) is appropriately "self-regulated". I argue for a notion of self-regulation, which means that an agent can (i) treat something as a reason, (ii) deliberate on that reason when considering how to act, and (iii) does so in a way that that her deliberation does bring about her acts. I consider several cases of intuitive trustworthiness that share these features. They also explain the incompatibility of an evaluation as trustworthy and engaging in certain acts (coercion, manipulation or – certain forms of – inducing): they undermine the self-regulation of an agent. "Trust" attitudes are those that track such features.

This account explains our divergent experiences of trust, illuminates why trustworthiness matters so much to us, and allows us to unify our research into trust. I then consider how this account can further research into trust. The current disagreement on the nature of trust comes from the highlighting of different forms of trustworthiness and trust. We can progress if we first identify the relevant social vulnerability. identify the potential features that may reduce it, and then mediate between accounts by seeing which does so most robustly. I illustrate the approach for the "reliance plus" accounts of trust.

Easton, Christina (University of Warwick)

"But you're her mother": The moral exploitation of women in family decision-making

[**Keywords**: *gender equality; moral risk; exploitation; mental load; parenting*]

Mental load – the combination of cognitive and emotional labour required to keep our lives running smoothly – tends to be carried by women more than men. This damages women's mental health, as well as their ability to compete on equal terms in the workplace. In this paper, I offer an additional, distinctive reason to be concerned with this uneven distribution of mental load. Many of the decisions that parents make are moral decisions – they carry with them the opportunity to commit wrongdoing. So, mothers are being saddled with additional 'moral load' (Callahan 2021), and with that, increased moral risk. Drawing on Parry & Easton (2023), I argue that increased exposure to moral risk is bad. Current structural arrangements and social norms wrong mothers by imposing an unjust distribution of moral risk. Moreover, this amounts to a form of wrongful structural moral exploitation. Moral exploitation is a distinctive form of exploitation outlined by Robillard and Strawser (2016; 2022), where an exploiter takes unfair advantage of an exploitee's vulnerability to compel them to accept additional decision-making, moral responsibility and emotional guilt. I show why the case under consideration meets the conditions of moral exploitation, including the ways in which men benefit from the lower mental load and how women's reasonable options are limited, rendering them vulnerable. I then consider and respond to some objections: I argue that women's informed consent, even if present, doesn't vitiate the wrong done here, and that women are not adequately compensated by the significant moral goods of parenting, since they could receive these without the existing maldistribution of moral load. I finish by discussing possible practical implications of my argument, including for individual men and for wider society (e.g. flexible working policies and paternity leave).

Fischer, Jessica (Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich)

Couldn't Be Happier: The Non-Identity Intuition and Valuing People

[**Keywords**: *non-identity problem; procreative beneficence; bearer-regarding reasons; Johann Frick*]

This paper raises a worry about the non-identity intuition. Underlying the non-identity problem, the non-identity intuition tells us that when choosing between bringing a person with a good life into existence and bringing a person with a great life into existence, we have moral reason to bring the person with a great life into existence. But there is a worry about the non-identity intuition which

should give us pause. When stating that one has reason to bring the person with a great life into existence, the non-identity intuition proceeds by comparing future persons exclusively in regard to their differential levels of well-being. Yet this kind of comparison, or so this paper proposes, contains a reductive way of valuing individuals. It may thus fail to fulfil the basic desideratum that our moral principles should be compatible with the fact that we value individuals for their own sake.

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Fisher, Sarah (University College London)

Large language models and their big bullshit potential

[**Keywords**: *Bullshit; Truth; Large language models; ChatGPT; Public discourse*]

In the last 18 months, newly powerful large language models have burst onto the scene, with application across a wide range of functions—including chat, customer service, and internet search. Over the coming months, then, we should expect to begin encountering artificially generated text at rapidly increasing volumes and frequencies, across various areas of our lives. Yet some commentators have complained that large language models are essentially bullshitting, generating convincing output with no regard for the truth. If correct, that would make these artificial agents distinctively dangerous discourse participants, since bullshitters do not only undermine the norm of truthfulness (by deliberately saying false things) but the very normative value of truth itself (by treating it as entirely irrelevant). So, do large language models really bullshit? I argue that they do, since they generate sentences purely via next-word prediction, without checking their veracity (albeit this is a behaviour which can be curbed with appropriate guardrails). My analysis has important philosophical upshots. In addition to shedding light on the status of synthetic text, it recommends a new and improved definition of human bullshitting, as the production of verbal output without assessment for truth preservation. I show how this definition stands up against familiar criticisms—and gives us better purchase on a disturbing trend in contemporary public discourse.

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Floris, Giacomo (University of York)

The Invisible Social Class: Relational Equality and Extreme Social Exclusion

[**Keywords**: *Homelessness; invisibility; relational equality; social exclusion; social status hierarchy.*]

In this paper, I develop a novel, relational egalitarian theory of social exclusion that identifies the distinctive way(s) in which society fails to treat socially excluded individuals – such as people experiencing homelessness, individuals with substance use disorders and mental illness, and sex workers – as the equals of others.

I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I offer an overview of the "distributive wrongs" of social exclusion by illustrating the valuable goods socially excluded individuals are deprived of. In Section 3, I develop an account of the meaning and significance of the "relational wrong", and illustrate two aspects of this wrong – namely, the causal role and the expressive significance of institutional actions – which can neither be explained by nor reduced to its distributive consequences. Building on this, in sections 4 and 5, I put forward a "theory of invisibility" that identifies two distinct types of relational wrongs of social exclusion. In Section 4, I argue that society treats excluded individuals as "socially invisible", thereby conferring upon them the inferior social status of "things". In Section 5, I contend that society also treats excluded individuals as "physically invisible", thus ascribing to them the inferior social status of "persona non grata". Section 6 concludes.

If the arguments presented here are correct, vulnerable individuals who live excluded from the rest of society are not only deprived of some valuable goods necessary to live a minimally good life, but they are also located and kept at the very bottom of the social status hierarchy by being treated as invisible. The upshot, then, is that part of what is wrong with social exclusion is that it creates and maintains the invisible social class.

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Fornaroli, Giulio (Jagiellonian University, Krakow)

Doxastic Wrongs, Freedom of the Mind, and the Right to Wrong Others (in Our Thought)

An emerging consensus across epistemology and moral philosophy holds that one can wrong another by merely believing something to be the case (doxastic wrongs). In this essay, I am interested in a wider phenomenon. I want to understand whether moral agents can wrong one another through mental activities that are not restricted to beliefs, such as fantasies, suspicions, hypotheses, etc.

After having analyzed doxastic wrongs, I suggest we may want to consider a wider principle of wronging in thought (WT) according to which agents wrong each other whenever their mental deliberation is insufficiently sensitive to others' status as moral equals. I show that WT has distinct benefits and that its sole underlying premise is that there is such a thing as mental deliberation, i.e., at least some mental activities are responsive to reasons.

That people can wrong each other in their thoughts, however, still does not tell us whether wronging-in-though should be avoided, all-things-considered. In fact, I argue, a theory of wronging in thought should also find a proper role for freedom of the mind. I show that a plausible way of paying respect to freedom of the mind is by postulating a moral right to wrong others in our thought. The idea is far from paradoxical: we are often protected by rights to do something that, morally, we ought not to do (consider your right not to give part of your income to charity). The recognition of a right to wrong others in thought leads to two practical implications. The first is that wrongs in thought cannot give any authorization to coerce. The second is that wrongs in thought are not of universal concern: we are not required to protect others from wrongs-in-thought and victims of wrongs-in-thought cannot demand others' cooperation.

Frowe, Helen (Stockholm University)

The Permissibility of Collective Defence Agreements

Collective defence agreements, of the sort that exist between, for example, NATO members, EU members, and African Union members, commit their members to treating an attack on any one of them as an attack on all. Such agreements clearly have significant deterrent benefits for their members. They promise a degree of assistance that will make it almost impossible for an adversary to win an aggressive war against any member. On the face of it, then, such agreements seem obviously morally permissible and, indeed, morally desirable. However, I suspect that the moral picture is in fact much more mixed. The deterrent benefits that collective defence agreements secure for their members might well come at the expense of non-members. Non-NATO states are more likely to be attacked than NATO states, for example. Politicians also advert to these agreements to justify failing to directly assist non-NATO states, as we've seen in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Both pro and anti-Russian commentators have argued that NATO members cannot directly intervene in the war without risking escalation to World War Three, since any attack on a NATO member's armed forces would trigger Article 51 of the NATO treaty. Thus, collective defence agreements might not only make non-members more vulnerable to attack; they might also decrease the chances of non-members receiving defensive assistance. Nevertheless, it seems that it is at least sometimes permissible for agents to form collective defence agreements. This paper explores some of the ways in which collective defence agreements intersect with our duties to aid and our duties not to harm, identifying some moral constraints on how and when such agreements may be formed.

Golova, Anna (University of Oxford)

Is It Just the Depression Talking?

[*Keywords*: *depression; suicide; authenticity; autonomy*]

Suicidal thoughts are deemed a possible symptom and diagnostic criterion of depression. When a person diagnosed with depression utters a wish to die, many therefore assume that this must be 'the depression talking', i.e., that the person's wish is a result of her depression and thus cannot be 'truly her own'. The underlying argument against respecting a depressed individual's wish to die is that such a wish is inauthentic and cannot ground an autonomous choice to end one's life. Call this the 'The-Depression-Talking-Argument' (TDT-argument). Rejecting the TDT-argument, I argue that a depressed person's wish to die can be authentic and can ground an autonomous choice that prima facie warrants respect.

To argue for this view, I first formulate the target TDT-argument (following e.g., Tan et al., 2006) according to which a depressed person's choice to end her life cannot be autonomous because her wish is (a) inauthentic or (b) a result of a controlling influence. Rejecting this argument, in part 1 of the paper, I argue that a depressed person's wish to die can be authentic. Even if we accept the TDT-argument's assumption that a depressed person's wish to die is caused by her depression, this wish can be authentic. – Roughly, on my view, a depressed person's wish to die is authentic if she identifies with the wish and its cause in the appropriate way. In part 2, I reject the assumption that a depressed person's wish to die is caused by her depression. Instead, I argue for a constitutive relation between depression and wish to die, which leaves the claim that depression undermines autonomous choice by acting as a controlling influence unfounded. Finally, I refine my account and consider wider implications for the question whether and when we ought to respect a depressed person's choice to end her life.

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González-Ricoy, Iñigo (University of Barcelona)

Efficient Production Without Domination: The Case of Labor-Managed Firms

[*Keywords*: *workplace democracy; relational equality; nondomination; productive efficiency*]

Extant normative views of labor-managed firms have largely neglected considerations of productive efficiency. Relational egalitarian and republican views have been particularly foreign to such considerations because they home in on avoiding workplace hierarchies of domination, which seems to serve workers' interests, whereas efficient production seems to serve the interests of investors and consumers. Efficiency and nondomination are hard to square, then, because they seem to ground competing requirements. But they need not, I argue, once we conceive of productive efficiency as an interest that workers, and not just investors or consumers, have. Workers have an interest in their companies being efficiently run, I argue, to avoid (i) that managers abuse them in ways that have no economic rationale, like taste-based discrimination or sexual harassment, and (ii) that they fail to discharge their prospective duties not to create the conditions under which market competition may compel them to abuse their staff, say, by cutting their pay or dismissing them to avoid going under. Yet, in seeking to boost their firms' efficiency, bosses may also deploy their authority over employees to cut down on labor costs. And even if they may not, on the assumption that happier workers are more productive, this attitude would be motivated by the wrong reasons and would be counterfactually weak. Productive efficiency poses a conundrum, then, because it may both serve and upset nondomination. Labor-managed firms offer a solution to this conundrum, I argue, for they are uniquely located to jointly satisfy the efficiency and the nondomination requirements. Leaning on recent empirical analyses of the efficiency effects of labor-managed firms, I argue that such firms suitably uphold efficiency while offering mechanisms whereby workers have control over how efficient production is to be pursued, robustly securing their interest in nondomination as a result.

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Hecht, Lisa (Technische Universität Dresden)

Pacifist Duties and the Permissibility of National Defence

[**Keywords**: *national defence, pacifism, sovereignty*]

It is widely accepted that a state may defend its territory and sovereignty with proportionate and necessary force against unjust aggression. In this paper, I challenge this idea. I defend the following thesis: waging a war of national defence is permissible only if the defender state fulfilled its pacifist duties. I understand pacifist duties as duties to build strong international institutions which can coordinate, adjudicate and enforce decisions whenever conflicts arise and thereby reduce the prevalence and costs of conflicts.

In defence of my thesis, I argue that only rightfully sovereign states may defend their sovereignty and that fulfilment of pacifist duties is one condition for rightful enjoyment of sovereignty. Sovereignty understood as the supreme authority over the population of a given territory and independence from external interference needs justification. One way to justify this supreme authority is to say that those subject to it did, could have or should have consented to it. This explains the commonly accepted conditionality of rightful enjoyment of sovereignty, namely non-aggression against other states' people and its own citizens. Those subject to a state's authority could not consent to the intentional violation of their rights. However, the implications are broader than is usually made out. I show how legitimate pursuit of interests can pose justified and excused threats and contribute to collective threats. While those subject to these types of threats could not consent to being exposed to them, they could not want sovereignty to be conditional on not posing such threats either. It is in every citizenry's interest that their state pursues their legitimate interest even if these come with threats. Strong international institutions can mitigate those threats. I conclude that a state's supreme authority could be consented to only if the state fulfils its pacifist duties. Since it should be obvious that one may not defend what one does not rightfully enjoy, the preceding argument supports my thesis. I will spell out the implications in more detail.

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Hillier-Smith, Bradley (University of St Andrews)

The Moral Harms of Homelessness

[**Keywords**: *Homelessness; Poverty; Status Poverty; Relational Equality*]

It is well-established that those facing homelessness suffer severe harms and deprivations. Homeless persons are, or at least are among, the worst off people in a given society. And yet, homelessness is a relatively undertheorised issue in ethics, and social and political philosophy, and remains an enduring feature of affluent, liberal democratic societies. This paper aims to provide an account of the underacknowledged moral harms of homelessness that can ground and motivate adequate durable solutions and public policy reform to alleviate homelessness in contemporary societies. I argue that the few existing philosophical accounts of understanding and responding to the moral harms of homelessness - the Freedom-Based, Privacy-Based and Care-Based Accounts - each reveal important insights but nonetheless suffer from serious limitations. I advance a novel Status-Based Account that foregrounds the social and moral status poverty of homeless persons. This account, I suggest, reveals an underacknowledged but fundamental moral harm of homelessness, addresses the limitations of existing accounts, and grounds adequate durable solutions. This more complete account can then help challenge the unsettling tacit acceptance of homelessness in contemporary societies and provide the normative framework for necessary and urgent reform.

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Isern-Mas and Almagro, Carme and Manuel (University of the Balearic Islands and University of Granada)

The Affective Injustice of Therapy-Speak

[**Keywords**: *therapy-speak, mental health, epistemic injustice, affective injustice, epistemic power, epistemic authority*]

Therapy speak involves integrating therapeutic language and concepts into everyday communication. Despite the growing interest in therapy-speak within public discourse, particularly on social media, there is no examination of its epistemic and ethical concerns in the scholarly literature. On the epistemic front, when used outside of a therapeutic context, therapy-speak is susceptible to misunderstanding, misapplication, pathologizing, the dilution of the meaning of therapeutic terms, and the risk of self-diagnosis. Regarding its ethical concerns, therapy-speak can be used to discredit individuals, evade responsibilities, and even signal social status, by taking an objective stance. Beyond these epistemic and ethical concerns, we argue that therapy-speak can also be weaponized to generate affective injustice, particularly when people impose a specific way to manage challenging situations, based on an unjustified entitlement which exploits the epistemic authority and the credibility excesses of medical evidence and the conflation between descriptive and normative terms.

Killmister, Suzy (Monash University)

Why (and how) should we value one another?

[**Keywords**:]

In his book Human Dignity and Political Criticism, Colin Bird rejects the Kantian claim that dignity refers to an inherent and immutable worth, and instead develops an account of dignity as a 'socially emergent property'. Through an analogy with the economic concept of market price, Bird argues that human dignity emerges through a particular kind of social exchange. More precisely, he claims that 'human dignity is constituted by independently expressed attitudes of respect for people and their lives'. In this paper I take up and extend Bird's claim, using public response to the war in Gaza as a point of reference. I first suggest an extension of Bird's framework, such that dignity is constituted by loving attention as well as by respect. I then turn to a pressing normative concern: if human dignity amounts to a certain kind of worth, and that worth is determined by patterns of interaction, what could it mean to misvalue other human beings? Resisting the temptation to retreat to a notion of inherent worth, I instead explore whether the economic analogy can be stretched further in order to support the claim that we have a moral duty to dignify one another.

Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper (University of Aarhus)

Are stereotypers wronged when stereotyped? On defeated doxastic rights and structural, doxastic injustice

[**Keywords**: *Doxastic rights forfeiture; doxastic wrongs; ethics of belief; structural injustice.*]

Recently, several philosophers have defended the view that in virtue of holding a certain belief, we might be doing something which is morally objectionable even if, in some sense, that belief is well supported by our evidence. Generally, such philosophers take the moral objectionableness in question to be a personal, doxastic wrong. In the case of personal, non-doxastic wrongs, sometimes an act, which would otherwise have constituted such a wrong, does not do so, i.e., in these cases the rights in question are defeated as it were. Such defeat can arise either because of how the benefits to the rights holder of the act clearly outweighs the harms in such a way that consent to the act in question can be presumed, or because of what the victim of that act does, i.e., they waive or forfeit the right against others that they do not subject the rights holder to the relevant treatment. I argue that something similar can occur when it comes to personal, doxastic wrongs. But even if such situations might not involve any personal, doxastic wrongs, they might still involve structural, doxastic injustice. In fact, we need the notion of structural, doxastic injustice to explain the sense that some such situations are morally objectionable, despite the absence of any personal doxastic wrongs.

These two ideas – that doxastic rights are sometimes defeated and the notion of structural, doxastic injustice – are this talk's two contributions to the ethics of belief.

Mac, Linh (The University of Tennessee, Knoxville)

Krinostic Injustice

[**Keywords**: *epistemic injustice, krinostic Injustice, characterization, basic description*]

Relying on what I call a distinction between basic and interpretative reports (BID), the paper illuminates a phenomenon in which a hearer believes a speaker's testimonies insofar they constitute basic reports, such as recollections of a series of events, but disbelieves the speaker's testimony concerning the characterization of their experience. To motivate BID, I examine a lawyer's cross-examination of a complainant in a sexual assault case before developing a preliminary account of BID and explaining how a hearer's disbelief of a speaker's interpretative report constitutes testimonial-hermeneutical injustice. I call this species of epistemic injustice "krinostic" injustice, given that it's injustice in respect of judgment (in Ancient Greek, the verb κρΐνω means "to decide"). Finally, I address potential objections to my view.

Masny, Michal (UC Berkeley)

Work and the Good of Detachment

[**Keywords**: *Work; Non-monetary goods of work; Detachment; Automation*]

Recent literature in the philosophy of work emphasises the importance of non-monetary goods of work. For example, Anca Gheaus and Lisa Herzog (2016) argue that, for many people, work is the most important context in which they can attain excellence at something, experience community, make a social contribution, and gain social recognition. This claim has important upshots for our understanding of the badness of unemployment and the desirability of particular jobs, among other things.

In this paper, I argue that there is a further important non-monetary good of work that has been overlooked. To illustrate the core idea, I want to refer to a recent memoir by the acclaimed actor, Patrick Stewart (2023). In the memoir, he reflects on his traumatic childhood and says that his primary attraction to acting was that he could "forget about being Patrick Stewart, if only for a few hours a week". I think that Stewart's remark highlights two important issues. The first issue concerns well-being: we all seek out opportunities to regularly distance or detach ourselves from what we feel, think, aspire to, and are responsible for in our private lives. The second issue concerns the importance of work: for many people, work is the most important context in which they can do that, regardless of whether they are an actor, a construction worker, or a philosophy professor.

In the paper, I expound on these issues. Specifically, I argue that we have a basic need to regularly detach ourselves from the central aspects of our private identities, that work tends to provide better opportunities for that than some of the obvious alternatives (such as athletic, artistic, and spiritual activities), and that because of this, we should be concerned about the changing nature of work and the prospect of widespread technological unemployment.

McKeever, Natasha (University of Leeds)

Why is sex work so gendered?

[**Keywords**: *sex work; prostitution; sex; gender; gender norms*]

Sex work is highly gendered, with 80% of sex workers being female, and the vast majority of buyers of sex being male. Implicit in much discussion of sex work is the assumption that sex work just is gendered, and that that it is simply not plausible that there will ever be an equal number of female and male buyers and sellers of sex. In this paper, I question this assumption. I first challenge three potential explanations for the gender imbalance in sex work: 1) the argument that it is due to biology;

2) the argument that it is due to the difference in the availability of casual sex for men and women; and 3) the patriarchy argument.

The patriarchy argument contends that gendered sexual norms explain the existence of sex work, and that in their absence, sex work would not exist. I argue that it is more probable that gendered sexual norms are a significant reason for why sex work is so gendered, but that it would likely exist even under conditions of gender equality. In particular, I consider the norms that: 1) men should be sexually dominant and women sexually submissive, and 2) sexual purity is important for women but not for men. Acknowledging the role of these norms in sex work is an important step in the consideration of how to improve conditions for sex workers more generally, since they likely have a role in the stigma, discrimination, and violence sex workers face.

McTernan, Emily (University College London (UCL))

The ethics of sexual advances

[**Keywords**: *sexual advances; associative duties; sexual harassment; equality*]

We must be morally permitted to make sexual advances, since this is how we get valuable and deeply important associations and forms of intimacy off the ground. Yet unwanted sexual advances often wrong the person subjected to them and sometimes contribute to, and are shaped by, the subordination of women. This presents a puzzle. Are we, or are we not, morally permitted to make sexual advances, since some will turn out to be unwanted? How can we mark out the permissible from the impermissible sexual advance?

I begin by defending the need for an ethic of sexual advances, explaining why literature on sexual harassment does not suffice. I canvass but dismiss a range of ideas about what distinguishes permissible from impermissible sexual advances: those at work, compared to those elsewhere; those that are unwanted, compared to those wanted; those that contribute to women's inequality, and those that don't; and those that are consented to or 'invited', and those that are not. None of these, I argue, can bear the requisite moral weight.

The second part of the paper then offers an account of the interpersonal wrong done by unwanted sexual advances and, to a lesser degree, some wanted sexual advances, grounded on our associative duties. The unwanted sexual advance unilaterally violates the shared norms and expectations of an ongoing association, so jeopardizing that association, the value we get from it, and any plans that depend upon it. This associative account describes the wrong of an unwanted advance in itself, as well as framing two dimensions of the wrong they do within unjust societies, given the background power dynamics and the devaluing of non-sexual relations with women. Fortunately, the associative account also makes visible an alternative to the sexual advance: a dynamic and mutual renegotiation of the nature and form of our joint endeavour.

Miklos, Andras (University of Rochester) and **Miklos-Thal, Jeanine** (University of Rochester)

The Ethics of Online Steering

[**Keywords**: *Steering; social welfare; equal treatment, manipulation; transparency*]

This paper offers an ethical analysis of online steering, the practice of personalizing search results based on data about users, in e-commerce. While the existing business ethics literature has analyzed various forms of price discrimination, whereby a seller charges different prices for the same good to different buyers, the practice of steering has not received much attention in this literature so far. Our paper aims to fill this gap. This is important for practical purposes because empirical evidence suggests that in e-commerce steering is a more commonly used practice than price discrimination. Moreover, firms like Orbitz have used the argument that they did not in fact charge different prices for the same product to different consumers as a first line of defense in reaction to revelations of steering on their sites. It is therefore important to understand the differences and similarities between price discrimination and steering, and the ethical implications of these differences and similarities.

We first outline the parallels and differences between online steering and price discrimination, arguing that online steering is more likely to benefit consumers and social welfare than price discrimination. Next, we argue that while online steering does not violate any plausible specification of the equal-treatment norm, it involves an element of manipulation that is absent in price discrimination and that by itself raises ethical concerns regardless of the effects of online steering. We show that steering may violate a requirement to respect consumers' autonomy when it undermines consumers' capacity to make rational decisions or when it shapes consumers' choices in ways that are impossible or difficult for them to monitor. We conclude by outlining the policy implications and ethical constraints that should be considered in the context of steering. We defend a transparency condition requiring that consumers should have an understanding of the algorithms used for steering, including what type of data is used and how that data translates into the presented search results.

Molyneux, David (IDEA Applied Ethics, University of Leeds)

Doing and allowing harm - all about causation?

[**Keywords**: *Doing and allowing; Causation and causal explanation; Moral responsibility*]

There seems to be a moral difference between the harm that flows from doing and the harm that flows from allowing. In general, the responsibility for a harm that flows from a doing is morally worse than the harm that flows from an allowing.

Why is this? One explanation that is often dismissed in the literature is the contribution of causation. I claim that doing harm involves causation and allowing harm does not. This claim is controversial because it is commonly accepted that allowing also causes – so when a gardener fails to water the plants and the plants die, we say that the gardener caused the plants to die.

I argue that this is wrong; allowing harm is never causal. I provide several reasons why this is so, based on the necessity of events in causation, and the difficulty that accepted theories of causation have in explaining causation by omission. I then argue that whilst allowings do not cause, they can be involved in the explanation of outcomes, and I differentiate between causation and explanation.

As agents can be morally responsible for allowings as well as doings, and moral responsibility for allowing does not depend on causation, there must be alternative mechanisms for the ascription of moral responsibility for allowings. One mechanism is via the role of the agent. For example, the responsibility of a doctor for the allowing of harm is much greater than the responsibility of (say) a passer-by for allowing the same harm. Another possible route to moral responsibility is via familial links – the responsibility of a parent for allowing harm to a child is much higher than for a non-parent. Both these methods of ascribing moral responsibility for allowings rely on explanation rather than causation.

Moraro, Piero (Edith Cowan University)

Can there be a moral right to civil disobedience?

[**Keywords**: *civil disobedience*]

In recent years, the philosophical debate on civil disobedience (CD) has focused on two major themes. One concerns the long-standing idea of CD as an inherently 'communicative' action: what separates CD from other forms of law defiance is the attempt to engage others in a rational dialogue concerning a certain law or policy. CD therefore differs from acts of mere 'expression', for it requires

an audience, or addressee, whom the speaker seeks to engage in a dialogue. A second (and related) theme that has received attention in recent philosophical debates concerns the idea of a moral right to CD. Those who uphold this idea claim that the state should not punish citizens for engaging in CD,

i.e., for exercising their moral rights. In this talk, I argue that, if citizens possess a moral right to CD, then the state also bears some positive duty to engage in the dialogue the protesters seek to initiate.

This is necessary if the state is to properly acknowledge the communicative nature of the illegal protest. I argue that if (a) CD is to be conceived as a communicative (rather than merely expressive)

form of law-breaking, and if (b) citizens possess a moral right to CD, then (c) the state should not only refrain from punishing those who engage in this form of protest, but should also support their "dialogic effort" (Brownlee 2012) by addressing their demands. This, however, introduces major difficulties for the plausibility of a moral right to CD, which I discuss in the final part of my talk.

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Mowla, Pascal (University of Oxford)

What Makes Nepotism Wrong?

[**Keywords**: *distributive justice; partiality; equality; discrimination; competition*]

Why is it wrong to distribute goods nepotistically, and is it always wrong to do so? Ordinary morality typically frowns upon nepotism and yet nepotistic activity is rarely, if ever, the target of coercive policy and state intervention. In addition, widespread disdain for nepotistic hierarchies is seldom mirrored by a disapproval of special relationships and the exchange of personal favours to which we are all indebted. We regularly dismiss those who profit from personal ties as the unfair beneficiaries of corruption or good fortune, and yet recognition of the deep significance that these relationships have for us is nearly universal. In the United Kingdom, successive Conservative governments have come under fire for awarding lucrative government contracts to individuals and companies with intimate links to party officials.1 Online, public discourse takes aim at so-called "nepo babies": the children of celebrity (or otherwise well-connected) parents who happen to stumble into successful careers within the entertainment industry.2 Despite the outcry which often follows these revelations, few entertain the impermissibility of nepotism tout court and many more appear to value opportunities for collaboration with their nearest and dearest.

In this paper, I evaluate three accounts of the wrong of nepotism in response to their ability to: (1.) account for the wrong-making features which different cases present; and (2.) provide a plausible distinction between permissible and impermissible nepotistic activity. Though a satisfactory response to these questions may initially seem simple or even obvious to some, further investigation reveals the problem to be deceptively complex. As there are a conceivably vast number of objections to nepotism, I limit my focus here to those which provide the most coverage in terms of applying to a diverse range of cases, and which regularly feature in the condemnation of nepotistic activity..

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Oberman, Kieran (LSE)

Enough Spurious Distinctions: Refugees are Just People in Need of Refuge

[**Keywords**: *Refugees; refugee ethics; migration;*]

What makes refugees different to non-refugee migrants? A plausible answer is that refugees need refuge. Within their home state, they fall below some threshold. To fulfil their basic human needs, they must migrate elsewhere. It is because refugees need refuge that they have an especially strong claim to refuge. States are obligated to admit them at least when they can do so without severe cost. Call this the "Needs Account" of refugeehood. The Needs Account combines a needs-based definition of a refugee with a needs-based argument for refugee protection.

While the Needs Account is intuitive, it is also controversial. Part of the controversy is its departure from international law. The UN Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". This is a much narrower definition.

The Needs Account has also proved controversial among scholars studying the ethics of refugee policy. While the account, or something close to it, was once proposed by Andrew E. Shacknove, it has since been widely criticised. Scholars have claimed there is some further factor, beyond need, essential to the definition of a refugee and the argument for refugee protection. Suggested factors

include the impossibility of assistance in situ and the need to legitimise the state system. Even Shacknove includes other factors alongside need.

This article defends an unadulterated needs account. Refugees are just people in need of refuge. The alternative accounts refer us to factors that are morally spurious. Given that international law currently draws morally spurious distinctions between those it classifies as refugees and others in need of refuge, and given that, as the public debate demonstrates, this has harmful consequences, refugee ethicists should not commit the same mistake.

Parmer, Jared (RWTH Aachen University) and **Kempt, Hendrik** (RWTH Aachen University)

Against the Right to Explanation for Black-Box AI

[**Keywords**: *explainability; expertise; right to explanation; algorithmic opacity*]

Being subject to impactful decisions like mortgages, medical procedures, and prison sentences, some claim, comes with the right to an explanation for such decisions – a 'decision subject' is entitled to explanations for why those decisions were made. When these decisions are based on recommendations of algorithmically opaque AI models ("black boxes"), no such explanation may be available, risking a decision subject being wronged by AI decision-making.

We argue that decision subjects do not have a right to explanation. Our argument turns on the role that expertise plays in human affairs. We focus on Kate Vredenburgh's contractualist justification of a right to explanation (2022). Her argument rests on two claims: that explanations are necessary for informed self-advocacy which is of widespread interest, and that they are not so costly that requiring explanations could be reasonably rejected. We resist Vredenburgh's argument at both points.

First, explanations are not necessary for informed self-advocacy. All aspects of the advocacy that Vredenburgh highlights can be vouchsafed by having reliable expert advocates working on a layperson's behalf, even when no intelligible explanations for their decisions can be given. Second, an explanation-requirement can be rejected as too costly: The point of expertise is to divide up labor so members of a community can specialize for collective benefit. Expert specialization empowers communities precisely because the shared access to understanding and know-how goes beyond what is (or could be) common to most of its members. A right to explanations increases the opportunity costs to provide such explanations beyond reasonable limits.

Thus, Vredenburgh's argument does not succeed. More generally, these arguments demonstrate the deep tension between demands for explainability of opaque systems, and the division of cognitive labor, which ought to feature more prominently in the debate to make AI more explainable.

Pilapil, Renante (Ateneo de Davao University, Philippines)

What COVID-19 Taught Us About the Nature of Human Rights: From Individualistic to Relational Approach

[**Keywords**: *human rights; relational; individualistic; human community*]

This paper explores the ways by which the COVID-19 pandemic has taught us about the un-tenability of the individualistic conception of human rights. Its arguments are threefold. Firstly, the individualistic conception portrays the picture of human rights as a zero-sum game which stems from the erroneous view that reduces rights into objects or properties such as a piece of land, money, or housing that can be distributed and possessed. Secondly, the notion of "rights as an absolute possession" regards rights as having no limits so that they can be demanded from others no matter the consequences. And thirdly, the individualistic conception of human rights erroneously paints the picture of the human condition that is antagonistic and full of conflicts.

Against the individualistic conception of human rights, the paper proposes that human rights are relational in that, first, human rights structure relations; and second, human rights are products of social relationships. Although it can be said that human rights are derived from person's basic universal human capacities that ought to be respected—autonomy, liberty, or dignity—they only make

sense in the context of how they structure relations, may they be between and among human individuals, between citizens and the state, between individuals and non-state actors such as corporations and other institutions. Meanwhile, human rights are products of human being's social relationships rooted in their nature as relational. In the world of human rights, the kind of social relationship involved is the relationship between human beings as human beings, that is, as members of the human community understood as "thin" because our relationship with fellow human beings as human beings is rather distant and anonymous, and not based on personal experience or shared history.

Placani, Adriana (NOVA University of Lisbon)

Individual Responsibility for Collective Climate Change Harms

[**Keywords**: *climate change; moral responsibility; individual responsibility; collective responsibility; elizabeth cripps*]

Individual agents should do many things, but averting the harms of climate change is not one of them. This is partly because no single individual could possibly avert (or cause) such harms by themselves. Both causing and averting the harms of climate change requires joint or collective action. This is one of the basic, albeit rough, intuitive thoughts behind some collectivists' accounts (e.g., Cripps, Sinnott-Armstrong) who argue that duties to avert climate harms are primarily collective. This work employs Cripps' (2013) account of responsibility, which is staunchly collectivist, in order to ground an individual duty to reduce one's GHG emissions. This is significant not only as a critique of Cripps, but also as an indication that even on some collectivist footings that emphasize the collective nature of climate change and the inefficacy of individuals, individuals can be assigned primary duties to reduce their GHG emissions. Following Cripps (2013), this work holds the unstructured group of GHG emitters weakly collectively responsible for harm inasmuch as this putative group can be identified as the cause of reasonably foreseeable and avoidable climate change harms. However, it argues against Cripps that what follows from this is a corresponding collective duty to act qua group to bring about an end to the harm and a derivative duty for each emitter to promote the required organization of a group capable of this. Instead, this work argues that acts of GHG emission, to the extent that they are avoidable and performed with requisite knowledge, make one into a member of a group that is morally responsible for climate-related harms. Individual emitters who can do otherwise (i.e., not emit at reasonable cost to themselves) should recognize themselves as members of a group that collectively harms. Subsequently, they should take all possible steps in order to cease such membership by reducing their GHG emissions. Thus, this work argues that what follows from assigning weakly collective responsibility to the putative group of GHG emitters as Cripps does, is a personal duty that falls on each individual member to renounce membership in this group.

Ramrath, Ronya (University of Oxford)

Knowledge of the marginalised or marginalised knowledge? Indigenous knowledge and epistemic injustice

[**Keywords**: *Epistemic injustice; Indigenous knowledge; hermeneutical resources; epistemology*]

Sometimes, it isn't one's social marginalisation that leads to one's marginalisation as a knower, but the nature of that knowledge itself. Fricker coined the term 'epistemic injustice' to describe the wrongs done to someone as a subject of knowledge, focussing in particular on how one's social identity can lead to a credibility deficit. I want to describe a kind of epistemic injustice that isn't suffered purely on the basis of social identity prejudices, but also on the basis of prejudices against the alternative hermeneutical resources that underlie these knowledge claims. Occupying what one might call a meta-epistemological level, it is a devaluation not of a knower so much as of a way of knowing: what I call the devaluation of alternative hermeneutical resources.

This injustice is particularly evident in the case of Indigenous knowers: Indigenous attempts to conform to culturally specific intellectual norms often lead to friction with the academic mainstream, leading one Indigenous researcher to comment that "[e]ngaging with academia and following

[Aboriginal Law] within the context of colonialism is difficult and sometimes impossible." While there are certainly also social and structural reasons for these exclusions, I will show that they not reducible to Fricker's identity-based cases, since it is possible to experience this form of injustice despite inhabiting a non-marginalised social identity.

Taking seriously the idea of this kind of meta-epistemological injustice, however, leaves us in a quandary: does this commit us to accept, in the interest of epistemic justice, every alternative set of knowledge claims we are confronted with? I want to suggest at least two reasons why this isn't the case: first, the role of historical relations of oppression; second, differentiating between claims we have the resources to understand and thus critique, and those that we do not. An ethical knowledge practice ultimately requires epistemic humility.

Regmi, Sadie (London School of Economics & University of Oxford)

Revisiting the 'Samaritan' argument for political obligation

[***Keywords***: *Philosophy of Law, Political Obligation, Samaritan argument, Duty to Obey the Law, Political Philosophy*]

What grounds political obligation? A leading account of political obligation, proposed by Christopher Wellman, is grounded in the 'Samaritan' (hereafter samaritan) principle (Wellman & Simmons, 2005). The samaritan principle in Peter Singer's classic formulation is: "If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it" (Singer, 1972, p. 231).

A theory of political obligation based on the samaritan principle has at least two appealing features. First, it is compatible with various moral and political theories and can appeal to individuals who disagree about which theory of morality or justice is correct. Second, it is not paternalistic: our obligations derive from our duty to help others, not because we ourselves benefit. However, Wellman's account is vulnerable to the compensation objection.

In this paper, I argue for a revised 'Samaritan' argument for political obligation. First, I critique Wellman's account of political obligation, specifically the samaritan justification for coercion. Second, I present the compensation objection: I show that for Wellman's argument to succeed, he must explain why individuals who would be better off in state of nature ("robust individuals") do not deserve compensation for being coerced to help others. Third, I explore possible responses to the compensation objection, and I outline a promising response based on our shared vulnerability. Finally, I present an improved samaritan argument for political obligation.

Rüger, Korbinian (LMU Munich)

Distributive Justice, Consent, and Risk - The Case for Democratizing AI Development

[***Keywords***: *AI ethics; risk; consent; distributive justice*]

Artificial general intelligence (AGI) or strong AI is artificial intelligence that meets or exceeds human intellectual capabilities across all domains. So far, AGI does not, and it may never exist. However, even its potential future existence already raises fundamental moral questions. One of these questions concerns the distribution of risks and potential benefits associated with the development of AGI. The gravest risks associated with AGI are dispersed widely, while the benefits threaten to remain highly concentrated. I here argue that this structure violates central tenets of distributive justice and propose the democratization of AGI development as an attempt to address this challenge. In the paper, I thus defend the following four claims:

I.	The attempt to develop AGI is risky.

II.	The downsides of these risks are widely dispersed, while the upsides are potentially highly concentrated.

III.	This is unjust.

IV.   Democratizing AGI development is one way to address this injustice.

Robichaud, Philip (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Primacy of private blame

[***Keywords***: *blame, moral responsibility, punishment, ethics of blame, signalling*]

Much recent work on the nature and appropriateness conditions of blame sees expressed, interpersonal blame as paradigmatic. Accounts of the function of blame and its justification are shaped by understanding blame as a primarily "public" affair, with the result that private blame either isn't spoken to at all or, if it is, attempts to accommodate it seem ad hoc. Examples of such mismatches include recent functionalist characterizations of blame as a "costly signal" (e.g.: Shoemaker & Vargas, 2021) and instrumentalist justifications of blaming practices that locate the value of blaming in its effects on the development of moral agency (e.g.: McGeer, 2014). But, to whom does unexpressed, private blame signal and how is it costly? And, how could unexpressed, private blame even have the requisite effects on the development of others? Intrigued by the observation that most blaming seems actually to occur privately, I propose a reorientation of the debate that takes private blame as the primary phenomenon. In the paper, I will develop two versions of the primacy of private blame thesis, one which takes private blame as the paradigm phenomenon and then extends the analysis to cover overt blame, and another which takes all blame to be private blame and classifies "overt blame" as something else entirely. I then argue that once we avoid confusing blaming, which occurs privately, with blame's expression, we can enrich the discussions about the nature, justification and even the ethics of blame. For example, the considerations that would justify blame or make it (im)permissible no longer involve (in)direct negative effects of expressed blame on the blamee, which alters the relevant normative terrain in substantial ways. I conclude by canvassing the realignments in these related debates that would follow once we come to grips with private blame's primacy.

Smilansky, Saul (University of Haifa)

Is there a right to be deterred?

[***Keywords***: *Rights; moral obligations; deterrence; punishment; parents*]

Is There a Right to Be Deterred?

The notion of a "right to be deterred" (henceforth RTBD) from wrongdoing has not, to the best of my knowledge, ever been seriously considered, and clearly there is no thorough philosophical discussion of it. I argue that to some extent a RTBD exists, and people can be wronged by it's not being respected; reflecting upon it should be philosophically fruitful and morally significant.

I speak here of rights in a conventional way, and take them to be something like the principled moral and legal entitlements of persons. If people have an RTBD, they have a "valid claim" (Feinberg 1970) that considerable efforts be made to deter them.

An RTBD can be taken to be, roughly: (1) the claim that there is often a strong pro tanto moral case requiring the creation of a situation whereby a category of persons will be regularly deterred, by being given self-interested motivation, based upon credible threats, not to commit wrongs of certain types or in certain circumstances. (2) this moral case needs to be understood, at least in part, as deriving from the right of the potential wrongdoers. As with other rights, the RTBD poses corresponding obligations on certain others (i.e. it is a "claim-right"), be they family members, organizations or society as a whole. My claim is that there is, in certain circumscribed ways, a strong moral case for recognizing an RTBD, as a justified moral norm.

After introducing and defending the RTBD, I consider in some detail the way it unfolds in the context of state punishment; distinguishing it from familiar ideas by Herbert Morris and Warren Quinn. I consider numerous objections, and then begin to explore the implications of accepting a RTBD.

Steuwer, Bastian (Ashoka University)

Poverty, Market Prices, and Discrimination

[**Keywords**: *Discrimination; Poverty; Socioeconomic Discrimination; Markets; Reaction Qualifications*]

There are good reasons to think that it can be morally wrongful to discrimination on basis of economic status. However, the point of market and pricing mechanisms is to distinguish (discriminate) between those with the ability to pay and those without – seemingly without raising moral objections. On the contrary, the market mechanism serves important purposes. It allows us to efficiently allocate goods. Given a fair distribution of money, it allows persons to buy the bundle of resources which best suits their conception of the good life. If there is a problem with people being unable to afford goods, then it seems the objection is with the initial distribution of money and not the market mechanism.

In this article, I argue for two conclusions. First, considering economic discrimination as wrongful discrimination does not entail rejecting market and pricing mechanisms altogether. This is because wrongful economic discrimination occurs when poor people are stigmatized or stereotyped. If, for example, people are excluded from being goods due to snobbery, then this is a concern of economic discrimination. But if people are excluded due to lack of money, then this does not raise concerns of discrimination.

My second conclusion qualifies this. I argue that, nevertheless, in some cases charging a market price amounts to discrimination on basis of economic status. I point out that in some scenarios the genesis of market prices includes discriminatory attitudes towards the poor. If customers are willing to pay extra to avoid having to interact with poor people, then this creates a market price which incorporate this class bias. I suggest that housing markets are often of this kind. Furthermore, I draw connections and parallels to the problem of reaction qualifications.

Sticker, Martin (University of Bristol) and **Pinker, Felix** (University of Vienna)

Is Not Having Children Asking Too Much?

[**Keywords**: *climate, procreation, overdemandingness, fairness*]

Recently, a number of climate ethicists have argued that, for the sake of the climate, those living in high per-capita emitting countries ought to have fewer children. We call this position "Procreative Limitarianism". Opponents of this view believe that it is permissible to procreate given the contribution procreation can make for would-be procreators' lives going well.

An important underlying assumption is that there are limits to how much sacrifice morality can legitimately demand of us. Agents cannot be reasonably required to sacrifice goods that make their lives worth living. Chad Vance recently criticised the appeal to overdemandingness in the context of climate ethics. He argues that under the assumption that the additional emissions created through having a child cause harm to others, appeal to overdemandingness is unsuccessful.

We agree with Vance that demandingness considerations are much weaker in cases of directly harming others, but think that he is mistaken in characterising procreation as a straightforward case of causing harm. Instead, if procreation makes others worse off due to the additional GHG emissions it causes, then this effect is created through the actions of several intermediaries which are the primary bearers of responsibility for the harm caused: We collectively create social structures which make it the case that having a child causes large amounts of additional GHG emissions, as well as social structures that make people vulnerable to climate impacts that arise from these emissions. If someone forgoes procreation to avoid these harms, then this is best described as deflecting harm that we collectively would otherwise wrongly cause. This is a form of taking up others' slack, bearing an unfair level of cost. Slack-taking duties, we argue, are constrained by demandingness considerations. Hence, appeals to demandingness are successful in the debate concerning permissible procreation and climate change.

Suarez, Pyro (University of Bristol)

Oppression and Moral Realism

[**Keywords**: *metaethics; standpoint epistemology; metaphysics of ethics; epistemology of ethics; oppression.*]

According to Robust Moral Realism [RMR], moral properties are irreducible, non-natural, and not causally related to the agents' beliefs (Enoch 2011). This version of Moral Realism faces the challenge of characterizing how we can have moral knowledge and how can we explain the reliability of moral beliefs. In what can be considered a different family of literature, Standpoint Epistemology claims that under specific conditions related to the social identities of the agents, these might be in a better position to grasp some truths. Feminist standpoint epistemology highlights the idea that women, for instance, are in an epistemically better position to grasp some truths by virtue of belonging to a socially oppressed group (Srinivasan 2017, Harding 1991). Interestingly, the paradigmatic cases of these truths are either moral or morally relevant truths. This would suggest that specific causal profiles explain the differences in the reliability of the moral beliefs that some groups have. I argue that is a challenge for the defender of [RMR] to accommodate this phenomenon in their epistemology. The challenge relies on explaining how different causal profiles explain the higher reliability of the moral beliefs some groups have, while, at the same time, moral properties are considered causally inefficacious. I argue that if we posit epistemic virtues as playing a role in the generation of moral beliefs, [RMR] is able to successfully address the challenge.

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Sung, Leora (University College London)

Time Bias and Altruism

[**Keywords**: *time bias; altruism; charitable giving*]

People are typically time biased with respect to their well-being. For instance, we often display future bias, being more concerned with our future well-being than with our past well-being. In addition to future bias, many people also display near-future bias, being more concerned with their near-future well-being than with their distant-future well-being. In this paper, I argue that, because we display near-future bias, if we care enough about other people, there will be a point in time at which we care more about the present condition of other people than our distant-future condition. And since we morally ought to have a sufficient level of concern for other people, it follows that we morally ought to care more about the present condition of other people than about our distant-future condition, sacrificing our distant-future well-being in order to relieve the current suffering of others. I then draw out a practical implication of this observation. The claim that we ought to sacrifice our distant-future well-being to relieve the current suffering of others is particularly relevant for the ethics of charitable giving. This is because the decision to give to charity usually leads not to a reduction in the agent's immediate well-being but rather to a reduction in the agent's distant-future well-being. So, my argument calls into question the morality of saving up to secure our distant future when there are currently millions of people suffering around the world. Finally, I look at potential objections to my argument: First, I address the objection that we are not morally obligated to be so concerned with the welfare of distant strangers as to require us to be more concerned for their well-being than our distant-future well-being. Second, I address the objection that moral agents rationally ought to be temporally neutral rather than display time bias.

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Telech, Daniel (Lund University)

Invitations: Their Structure, Normativity, and Value

[**Keywords**: *invitations; requests; normative powers; relationships; consent*]

Invitations feature regularly in interpersonal life. They are important to us, even if Algernon's claim, that "Nothing annoys people so much as not receiving invitations" is an exaggeration. Invitations are also philosophically interesting. For one thing, in making an invitation (at least, under the right conditions, such that one's invitation is valid) one seems to generate a reason for the addressee.

When your friend invites you to his piano recital, he therein, among other things, provides you with a reason to attend, one that you previously did not have. But although invitations feature on standard lists of speech acts, we do not have a philosophical account of what they are, as we do with other normatively significant forms of address, e.g. promising, consenting, requesting. I provide such an account in this paper, proposing, roughly, that (valid) invitations are 1) a) permission-giving b) discretionary directives to participate in an activity that c) the addressor proposes to host, which 2) purport to express (among other attitudes) an attitude of hope that the addressee accept. My topic is invitation qua interpersonal form of address, to be distinguished from invitation in the causal-inferential sense (e.g. 'such and such argument invites the objection…'), and invitation in the advice-giving sense (e.g. 'I invite you to reconsider your view on…'). My account is constrained by desiderata that an adequate account of invitation ought to satisfy, namely the ability to distinguish invitations from offers, on the one hand, and proposals for joint activity, on the other. These desiderata inform my proposal of the interpersonal value of invitations, which I take to reside in agents having the power to exercise a kind of creative autonomy over the building and strengthening of their relationships.

Thau, Tena (University of Oxford) and **Kofi Bright, Liam** (University of Oxford)

The A Priori Case for Pacifism

[**Keywords**: *consequentialism; ethics of war; epistemic humility; nonviolence; pacifism*]

In this paper, we will offer an argument for pacifism that doesn't rest on deontological presuppositions. We will not claim that war is impossible to justify in principle, or that war has never been justified in the past. Rather, our contention is that any (present or possible) war is overwhelmingly likely to be unjustified—however attractive the case for it appears to you to be.

In Part I, we discuss higher-order reasons for doubting one's impression that a present or possible war is justified. The first reason is that, in the past, large majorities of the population (including many people who were very smart and well-intentioned) believed with great confidence that wars were justified—only for it to turn out that they were gravely wrong. The second reason is that—due government secrecy and deception, and the influence of the weapons industry over think tank research—your epistemic environment is stacked in favor of war. For these reasons, any impression you might form that a war is justified should be set aside.

But we do not think that agnosticism should fill its place. Rather, we contend that what you rationally should believe about any war (at the time it is being waged or agitated for) is that it is unjustified. In Part II, we offer three arguments in support of this claim: (1) an argument from induction, (2) an argument that involves some math, and (3) an argument from intuition. Any one these arguments, on its own, is sufficient to show that war is probably unjustified. All three of them, together, should make you even more confident in this.

Tsiakiri, Lydia (Aarhus University)

Sensitivity to Personal Responsibility: (Wrongfully) Discriminatory or Not?

[**Keywords**: *discrimination; personal responsibility; responsibility-sensitive policy; healthcare*]

Despite being ethically and legally condemned, discrimination remains a vague and frequently occurring phenomenon. An endless list of victims and perpetrators could be invoked, with most of us easily detecting its presence. After all, in its most generic definition, discrimination is essentially the disadvantageous differential treatment of the other who has or is believed to have some particular features (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2013). But what are these 'particular features' that deem disadvantageous differential treatment that targets them (wrongful) discrimination? Are they exclusively immutable features like race, or could they also be self-inflicted ones like poor health status? And, subsequently, could a policy that targets the latter be perceived as (wrongfully) discriminatory or not? To provide a plausible response to these questions, I initially examine these policies' compatibility with Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen's (2013) seminal definition of non-moralized

direct group discrimination. Then, I test their compatibility with certain accounts of indirect discrimination to explore whether they entail any unfair costs for those in need of protection and not, in fact, responsible for their condition. Eventually, I discuss whether these policies impose unjustified harm on imprudent individuals by wrongfully discriminating against them. Overall, the paper aims to suggest that under a responsibility-sensitive policy, non-moralized direct discrimination could occur.

Wang, Yifan (University of Pennsylvania)

A Challenge to the Epistemic Diversity Argument for Democracy

[**Keywords**: *Epistemic Democracy; Surveillance; Local Knowledge; Emergent Technology; Dictatorship*]

Theorists have made various consequentialist arguments to defend the superiority of democracy over alternative political systems. While recognizing that democracy has its issues in practice, they argue that democracy is bound to outperform autocracy in yielding good policy decisions that can effectively address political and social issues, which provides independent justifications for democracy in addition to procedural justifications. Along this line, theorists such as Elizabeth Anderson and Hélène Landemore argue that democracy is epistemically superior because it can leverage local knowledge from a diverse voter population, a strength that alternative political systems do not possess. However, a parallel epistemic argument can be made for alternative systems. Powered by modern information technologies, dictators and oligarchs can also access local information from diverse sources through mass surveillance, especially physical surveillance and surveillance embedded in markets. Relying on these emergent technologies such as AI-enabled facial recognition and blockchain-enabled recording of market information, some non-democratic regimes have already started collecting information about various aspects of people's lives that would otherwise be inaccessible, including detailed information about every individual transaction in various markets, back-end behavioral data possessed by private businesses, posts on social media, individuals' physical trajectories in public space, and more. Collected data can be constantly fed into statistical analysis to generate high-level insights to track economic and social issues and assist policymaking. Appealing to democracy's ability to harness local knowledge alone cannot provide sufficient justifications for democracy, since that ability is not unique to democracy. This raises further questions about whether it is altogether worthwhile to defend democracy by appealing to its epistemic strengths. Instead of searching for non-procedural consequentialist justifications for democracy, it makes more sense for scholars studying the epistemic strength of democracy to explore normative guidance on how democracies should be arranged in real life to optimize their epistemic potential.

Wells, Katy (University of Warwick)

Home Ownership and State Neutrality

[**Keywords**: *housing, tenure, neutrality, tenure neutrality, home ownership*]

In 2002, George Bush described home ownership as lying "at the heart of the American dream". He is not the first US president, nor the last, to do so. In the US, this kind of rhetoric around home ownership is backed up with cash. In 2016, the total projected tax expenditure for owner-occupied housing was $234 billion, a figure which does not include the interest-rate subsidy home-owners also benefitted from. In comparison, renters in the US only receive $47 billion in subsidies. Two-thirds of American households are home-owners, but these home-owners receive 80% of federal housing subsidies.

Prominent voices in the housing studies literature have long been critical of state promotion of homeownership. In political philosophy, however, we have been slower to engage with the issue. In this paper, I consider state action around housing tenure through the lens of a liberal commitment to state neutrality. I explore three questions. One, are questions of neutrality aptly asked, with reference to housing, and, more specifically, with reference to housing tenure? Two, if so, what does a liberal commitment to neutrality imply for state action around different tenure forms? Three, are there any good reasons for the state to depart from neutrality with respect to tenure form, and what are these?

I argue that questions of neutrality are aptly asked with reference to housing tenure, and I conclude that the kind of state promotion of home ownership we encounter in places like the US – except in certain limited non-ideal circumstances – is not permissible in light of a liberal commitment to state neutrality.

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Wilson, Emilia (University of St Andrews)

Ideological Frames, Imaginative Resistance and Counterspeech

[**Keywords**: *Ideology, Imaginative Resistance, Social Epistemology, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Disability*]

In this paper I examine ideological frames and how they can be challenged. Interpretive frames cue perspectives which shape how information is explanatorily, inquisitively, evaluatively and attentionally structured. Ideological frames misrepresent the world in such a way as to sustain (unjust) social practices. I begin by sketching an account of how ideological frames sustain injustice via obscuring alternative social arrangements. By misrepresenting contingent social arrangements as natural or inevitable, and thereby foreclosing the possibility of alternatives, they sustain those arrangements. I then turn to consider how these frames may be challenged via counterspeech. I illustrate how ideological frames can distort attempted counterspeech in ways that reconcile it with the dominant ideology. I analyse this misinterpretation by appeal to the literature on 'imaginative resistance' and develop an account of how ideological frames are likely to make perspectives which clash the dominant, hegemonic perspective are likely to be unintelligible. Finally, I show that, we can understand the task of 'counterspeech' in terms imagination: by enabling us to imagine that things could be otherwise, we gain understanding of contingent injustice(s). This highlights the importance of the aesthetic properties of counterspeech as these enable imaginative access.

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Panel Sessions

Panel 1:

Intellectual Character in a non-ideal world: New directions for virtue and vice epistemology

The recent 'non-ideal' turn in social and applied epistemology has responded to the claim that ideal epistemology cannot give us informative answers about epistemic norms in the real world. There are a plethora of problems in our epistemic environments and communities -- such as the spread of misinformation, widespread exclusion and marginalisation of certain social groups, and the influence of corrupting incentives. As a result, the evaluation of intellectual character cannot simply assume an ideal context. Instead, our understanding of what it means to be an excellent or flawed inquirer must be responsive to the ways in which epistemic character is shaped by and shapes social relationships -- including, and especially, those of power, privilege, and oppression. In recent years, several virtue and vice epistemologists have begun to address these concerns, challenging and modifying some central assumptions of ideal virtue and vice epistemology, or paying attention to neglected aspects of intellectual character development. The aim of this panel is to explore several of the issues that arise when doing non-ideal virtue and vice epistemology, including: the extent to which we are responsible for our intellectual character; whether traits which are typically understood as intellectual vices can be virtues under certain non-ideal conditions, and whether there is a distinctive category of 'liberatory' intellectual virtues which are required for surviving and resisting oppression.

Monypenny, Alice (University of Nottingham)

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Panel Papers

McKenna, Robin (Liverpool)

Responsibility in a Non-Ideal World

A central question in virtue and vice epistemology concerns whether we are responsible for our intellectual character traits, or for the consequences of those traits. Some have argued that (virtue and) vice epistemologists have a 'responsibility problem': it is unclear if they can make sense of our responsibility for our intellectual characters at all (Battaly, 2019). This, in turn, seems to threaten the intuitive idea that we are very much responsible for the consequences of our intellectual characters-- the dogmatic or prejudiced individual is very much responsible for the consequences of their dogmatism or prejudice. In this talk I will do two things. First, I will argue that this problem is an artefact of an overly idealised approach to virtue (and vice) epistemology. Second, I will sketch a less idealised way of thinking about responsibility for our intellectual characters, and for the consequences of our intellectual vices, such as epistemic injustice.

I will first sketch the contours of the distinction between ideal and non-ideal epistemology, both in general and as the distinction applies to virtue epistemology. I will then argue that the 'responsibility problem' involves two assumptions, both of which should be rejected: (1) that our 'social situatedness' is in tension with our status as responsible agents; and (2) that responsibility for the consequences of having a trait requires responsibility for possession of the trait.

Secondly, I will argue that we should view responsibilities as grounded in our social identities and roles. An educator, for example, has special responsibilities (e.g. to be open-minded when conversing with their students) purely because of the social role they occupy. I will also argue that we can view responsibility for epistemic injustice in these terms. We are all responsible for giving our interlocutors an appropriate degree of credibility and some of us have special responsibilities in this regard in virtue of our social roles.

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Matthews, Taylor (Southampton)

Contextualism, Courage, and the Avoidance of Error

Over the past decade, online misinformation, fake-news, and conspiracy theories have contributed to a shift in the virtue-epistemological landscape. One indication of this is the refreshing interest now being paid to intellectual vices (Cassam, 2019; Kidd et. al., 2020; Tanesini, 2021). A second indication is the emergence of normative contextualism. This is a methodological thesis, which holds that the normative status of some or all intellectual character traits is dependent on the epistemic environments of a given subject (Battaly, 2018, 2022; Kidd, 2020, 2021; Dillon, 2012; Monypenny, 2021). Despite counting as intellectual vice in normal epistemic environments, for example, Heather Battaly (2018) argues that close-mindedness can be an intellectual virtue in hostile epistemic environments because it produces good epistemic effects -- it enables agents to retain their true beliefs.

In this paper, I take issue with the normative contextualist project. Normative contextualists appeal to the good epistemic effects produced by a given intellectual trait within bad epistemic environments, viz. retaining true beliefs. Granting this, I argue that traits like close-mindedness nevertheless undermine an agent's epistemic justification for those beliefs. Furthermore, I claim that it is knowledge, as opposed to true belief, that we should value in bad epistemic environments. But insofar as traits like close-mindedness undermine a belief's epistemic justification, I claim that an agent's true beliefs cannot amount to knowledge. If we want to retain knowledge in epistemically polluted environments, normative contextualism is ill-placed to help us. Instead of shifting the normative status of intellectual traits, I propose that we recognise the importance of an epistemic motivation to avoid error. I end by sketching an account of intellectual courage framed in terms of this epistemic motivation and show that it allows us to retain the purported benefits of normative contextualism without its disadvantages.

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Muraviov, Heather (Notre Dame)

Liberatory Virtue Epistemology

Given the recent discussions in social and feminist epistemology, I suggest and motivate the need for a virtue epistemological framework that acknowledges the complex relationship between agents

engaged in resisting oppression and the formation of intellectual character and virtues. This paper marks the introduction of my framework for a liberatory analysis of intellectual virtue, which I call the KMT (Knowledge-Motivation-Telos) account. I embark on this analysis by arguing that conventional accounts of virtue epistemology do not have the conceptual resources to account for the important role that intellectual virtue plays in resisting oppression and engaging in liberatory projects. To fill this gap, I develop an account of liberatory intellectual virtues as traits that involve the agent's motivations to eradicate, subvert, and dismantle conditions of oppression, especially in cases where epistemic goods such as knowledge or truth are at stake. More specifically, liberatory intellectual virtues are made up of the following three components: knowledge of oppression, motivation to resist oppression and make progress toward liberation through epistemic means, and success in producing good liberatory effects (through successfully reaching the immediate target, skopos, and/or overall aims, telos). While my account will emphasize the motivation to engage in liberatory struggles as the main source for the development of liberatory intellectual virtues, I maintain that liberatory effects are still important to the possession of these traits. Then, I argue that experiencing or becoming aware of oppression is a necessary condition for the development of liberatory intellectual virtues.

Monypenny, Alice (Nottingham)

Evaluating Motivations in a Non-Ideal World

The language of virtue and vice is typically associated with evaluative responses of praise or blame: virtues are praiseworthy and vices are blameworthy. However, under non-ideal conditions, these options are not sufficient. When an individual develops the thick skin of closed-mindedness as a means of getting by in an environment heavily polluted with hate speech and dehumanising language, blame may be too simplistic a response. Instead, a more appropriate response may be to regret the development of closed-mindedness but recognise its value in responding to that environment. Likewise, when a member of a marginalised group is intellectually courageous and repeatedly incurs costs from challenging dominant and oppressive worldviews, we may commend her development of the trait, but recognise the overall damage that it has done to her intellectual, and general, well-being. As a result, virtue and vice epistemology for a non-ideal world must support a greater repertoire of evaluative responses to intellectual character. In this talk, I will demonstrate how this may be achieved by focusing specifically on our evaluation of motivations.

Motivationalist accounts to intellectual virtues and vices take motivations to be the target of evaluative responses to intellectual character. Broadly, there are two categories of motivations which may guide our engagement in inquiry: epistemic motivations (those oriented primarily towards the pursuit of epistemic goods) and non-epistemic motivations (those motivations which direct action primarily towards ends other than the pursuit of epistemic goods). Traditional approaches regard epistemic motivations as praiseworthy and non-epistemic motivations as blameworthy, or at the very least, criticisable. In this talk, I will challenge the orthodox motivationalist picture by arguing that under non-ideal and oppressive conditions, non-epistemic motivations can have value for maintaining basic functioning as an inquirer. This calls for a more complex evaluative response to non-epistemic motivations.

Panel 2:

Beyond the two-parent model: Multi-parenting, solo-parenting, revolutionary parenting

The two-parent model continues to dominate within legal frameworks and societal norms despite evolving family structures, even within unconventional or queer families. The legal validation of same-sex marriage in Western countries exemplifies this, as it endorses the two-parent model.

However, the conventional two-parent model has some flaws, including: (i) In the case of heterosexual two-parent childrearing, the gendered dynamics imposing disproportionate caregiving

burdens on women. (ii) A smaller amount of economic, psychological, emotional, and cultural resources available to two parents, compared to what a greater number of parents could provide.

At the same time, new trends are emerging. Examples include deliberate solo parenting, the exploration of configurations involving more than two parents, and creative ways of shaping co-parents' relationships after separation. There are alternative co-parenting structures, for example in queer families, African-American communities, and extended families (e.g., the inclusion of grandparents in a parental role). "Revolutionary parenting", a term introduced by bell hooks, denotes such arrangements in which non-parental childrearers take up a parent-like role, but without legal rights.

This panel explores parenting structures beyond the two-parent model, and their relationship with rights, duties, and principles of justice.

Key questions include:

1. What are the most morally desirable parenting configurations, considering both the child's and co-parents' interests?

2. In cases involving more than two parents or divorce, what moral obligations exist among co-parents? Do these differ from more traditional constellations, in which co-parenthood and couplehood overlap?

3. What rights and duties are inherent in unconventional forms of co-parenting, such as multi-parenting and other forms of child-rearing beyond the received idea of co-parenting ("revolutionary parenting")?

Hohl, Sabine (University of Basel)

Panel Papers

Hohl, Sabine (Basel)

Solo parenting by choice

In the past, solo parenthood usually was unchosen. It involves even heavier burdens than 'traditional' parenting in couples. But deliberate solo parenting may become more frequent in the future, with decreasing social stigma as well as increasing access to sperm donation. Not everyone interested in parenting finds someone they would like to parent with, and who would like to parent with them, and therefore, solo parenting may be the only way to become a parent for some. In other cases, it may be preferred also in the presence of other options. Interestingly, some of the reasons why some philosophers think parenting has particular value may be most present in solo parenting due to the absence of other people who can interfere with the way one would like to parent. But is it morally acceptable to pursue solo parenthood? Or does the potential lack of resources for the child, and the danger of domination through a single parent, mean that it should be discouraged?

Just as other forms of parenting, the viability of solo parenting depends in large part on its social circumstances. Well-supported solo parents may do just as well as two or more parents. Moreover, the acceptability of the solo parenting option could reduce the risk of people maintaining bad relationships for the sake of having someone to parent with. It may also reduce the risk of people failing to experience parenthood because of not having the 'right' romantic partner at the right time. But there is indeed reason to think that solo parenting involves an especially high risk of domination. This renders it important for solo parents -- or for society -- to ensure that other adults are present in children's lives, even if not in a parental role and that parental control does not violate children's interests.

Rensing, Johanna (Basel)

Collaboration or Coexistence? Exploration of Rights and Duties among Co-Parents

Co-parenting differs from the traditional understandings of parenting. There are two main differences: The potential number of people parenting together and that the parents do not have to be romantically or sexually involved with each other. It is less clear though what kind of normative profile arises from the concept of co-parenting. What kind of rights and duties do co-parents have towards each other? Do co-parents for example have the right to leave the mutual project of childrearing at any given point? I will show that the rights and duties among co-parents arise from the fact of undertaking a high-risk project together. To rear children comes with a certain risk for all parents involved: There is a financial risk, an emotional and gender-based risk, which the parents undertake for a substantial time of their life. To rear children is a life changing decision. Co-parents often decide consciously to take on these burdens and share the risks together. This is different for example to a situation of unplanned pregnancy or solo-mothers. The co-parents consent to undertake this high-risk project together and it raises the question of exit options. Under what conditions may any of them leave the co-parenting relationship? For example, when parents still want to be a parent to their child but do not want to collaborate with the other parent(s) at all? Is it possible for a child to have several single parents that coexist as parents but do not collaborate at all? Is there a minimum of parenting that always needs to be a collaboration as long as both (or more) parents agree to parent the same child? In other words: Is there a divorce in co-parenting?

Gheaus, Anca (CEU Vienna)

Children's interest in multiple caring relationships

Children have an interest in having caring relationships with several adults, relationships that enjoy protection in the sense that third parties are not permitted to dissolve them as long as they benefit the child. My talk states the various arguments in favour of this claim, and specifies the rights that protect this interest of children. Since children are future adults, it is welcome that qua adults, too, people are benefited from a childrearing regime that encourages many people to get involved in caring relationships with children. I briefly explain how such a regime is good for adults as well.

Miccoli, Francesca (Basel)

What do we owe to parents and childrearers beyond the dyadic model?

Western societies undergo currently a profound shift towards family pluralism, including a growing visibility of new, unconventional parental constellations. On the one hand, this transformation is fueled by advances in reproductive technologies, enabling new forms of voluntary solo parenting and same-sex parenting via gamete donation and surrogacy. On the other hand, multi-parenting is becoming more prevalent and visible, due to the rise in polyamorous relationships, an increasing number of stepfamilies where new partners and ex-partners are involved in child rearing, and challenging socioeconomic conditions that make it increasingly difficult to raise a child without relying on extended care networks. These circumstances include increased geographical mobility, resulting in people living far from their family of origin, and in 'multi-located' families, namely, cases when partners (sometimes, parents) live 'apart together'.

However, there remains inadequate legal recognition of non-heteronormative and non-mono-normative parenthood. Solo and multi parents lack sufficient public resources and regulations. Legal frameworks embrace a dyadic model when regulating family relationships, emphasizing biological ties over social connections, and neglecting the importance of family constellations with more than two responsible adults. This encompasses not only 'queer' non-normative multi-parenting such as 'poly'-parenting, but also more traditional cases, such as where grandparents shoulder a significant economic and caregiving burden, and stepfamilies.

This raises two critical questions: (i) In cases of multi-parenting where individuals voluntarily design a parental project involving more than two adults, is there inherent value or reason for the state to

recognize such families, and what rights and duties should be conferred to non-biological parents? (ii) In cases where two individuals act as 'parents', but a broader constellation of caregivers exists beyond them, should the latter be legally considered as parents, and if so, what rights should be attributed to them? Are these rights inherently 'parental' or do they differ in substance and degree?

Panel 3:

Structural Injustice

The idea of structural injustice is often invoked to make sense of morally problematic aspects of our society, from racism to sexism, to colonialism. As the term 'injustice' suggests, we think of structural injustices not just as harms but as wrongs, and as particularly serious wrongs. Wrongs of this kind are puzzling, however. It's clear what it is for someone to participate in a collective wrong, where the latter is understood as the product of individual contributions each of which is wrongful. But the notion of structural injustice refers to something different. These seem to be wrongs that are generated by a number of interactions, many of which do not seem wrongful (or at least blameworthy), taken individually. Moreover, structural injustices most often pose 'systematic' threats. That is, their various components seem in certain ways to be interconnected and mutually reinforcing, and they cause the harm in question to snowball, growing and crossing over many different social contexts. Racism and sexism beget more racism and sexism, and more severe racism and sexism; though they do so through mechanisms that often remain elusive, difficult to identify and explain.

Renzo, Massimo (King's College London)

Panel Papers

Estlund, David (Brown)

Moral Culprits and the Wrong of Structural Injustice

Leading theorists of structural injustice insist that it is wrong, but not dependent on wrongdoing by any agent. Many have been puzzled by this: how is it a wrong if no one commits it? Several ways to resolve this culprit problem, as I call it, are inadequate, or so I argue in a previous paper ('What's Unjust About Structural Injustice,' Ethics, April 2024). Here I propose a novel account, Basic Structural Proceduralism, which locates culpability, not in contributions to the presence or persistence of structural deficiencies, but in imposition by individuals of legal and other norms which is rendered wrongful as a result of those structural deficiencies. The wrong of this social injustice consists, not in the structural conditions themselves (irrespective of culprits) but in imposition of norms by individual agents which fail to be legitimated by the basic social structure. The social structure is 'deficient' in falling short of principles necessary for it to procedurally legitimate norms that are its outcomes. The wrong is in the individual conduct, but it is essentially structurally inflected; the wrong of non-legitimated imposition of norms by members of the society. As compared with other approaches, BSP has the following things (among others) to recommend it: 1) It finds a locus of culpability in plausible cases of structural injustice that might seem not necessarily to have any, which would put their status as wrongs in question. 2) It identifies ongoing blameworthy conduct (wrongful norm imposition) that is central to the injustice, rather than merely long past conduct (though not instead of it). 3) It accounts for intuitions that in a structurally unjust society some grievance is warranted towards one's fellows not only now rather than in the past, but also quite generally rather than, say, only toward agents of the law.

Moreau, Sophia (Toronto)

The Systemic Nature of Structural Injustices

The most troubling structural injustices have multiple components and stretch across different social contexts: they are systemic. We tend to think that systemic injustices are self-reinforcing and cause the disadvantages suffered by certain social groups to snowball, often through mechanisms that are invisible and difficult to pin down. What are these mechanisms? Why do they lead to disadvantage snowballing --that is, being not just perpetuated but exacerbated? And how could these mechanisms be invisible when the injustices themselves are so severe and widespread? I explore these questions by looking at the situation of Indigenous women in Canada, documented in the Final Report of our National Inquiry on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. I focus on three reinforcing and snowballing mechanisms. The first is a set of false stereotypes about Indigenous women that rationalize insidious norms for others in their interactions with them (the Barbarian Queen, the powerful warrior from whom we must be protected; the Squaw, the dirty, immoral threat to our society's mores). The second reinforcing and snowballing mechanism is the practice of 'individualizing' problems, of treating the problems faced by Indigenous women as predominantly due to their own poor choices and solvable through individualized legal mechanisms such as punishment under the criminal law, which blinds us to the many institutional causes of these problems. The third is the creation of what I call 'objectionable obligations': real obligations generated by unjust social circumstances that both tie down Indigenous women and yet generate suspicion that, because of their objectionable nature, they are not really binding and so cannot really be so burdensome. Although these are not the only mechanisms that reinforce structural injustices and cause them to snowball, I argue that they are important ones and likely at work in other cases as well.

Renzo, Massimo (King's College London)

Doxastic Wrongdoing and Structural Injustice

Moral justification and epistemic justification have been traditionally conceived as independent enterprises. Having a moral justification is a matter of adequately responding to our practical reasons, such as our reasons not to harm others unjustifiably. Having an epistemic justification is a matter of adequately responding to our epistemic reasons, primarily our reasons to accurately respond to the evidence available. Recently, this distinction has been challenged. Philosophers have started to pay attention to cases in which forming beliefs which seem impeccable on purely epistemic grounds involves wronging others. This has led some to reject the traditional view that what we should believe is exclusively determined by truth-related considerations, such as the evidence available. What we should believe, according to this approach, is also determined by moral considerations. When we fail to factor in such moral considerations, we can seriously wrong others by forming beliefs (Basu). This solution is appealing in that it vindicates the intuitively correct thought that certain beliefs can wrong (Gendler). But it comes at the cost of having to revise a picture of epistemic justification that seems independently plausible. I will offer an alternative account, which aims to vindicate the thought that we can be wronged by racist or discriminatory beliefs, without giving up the idea that by following sound epistemic standards we do not wrong anyone. At the heart of the account is a distinction between the question of whether certain beliefs wrong someone, and the question of who is responsible for the wrong in question. Responsibility for the wrong, I will argue, lies with those who are responsible for producing patterns of structural injustice whose existence renders certain beliefs apt. With this distinction, we can preserve the traditional idea that moral and epistemic standards are distinct. Qua believers, we should go where the evidence leads us.

Panel 4:

Brenda Almond Memorial Symposium—'It's a Family Affair'

Brenda Almond, who died in January 2023, was a co-founder, with Anthony O'Hear, of the Society for Applied Philosophy in 1982 and the Journal of Applied Philosophy in 1984, which she jointly edited until 2001. She was Professor Emerita in Social and Moral Philosophy at the University of Hull and was responsible for establishing the Social Values Research Centre in 1992, which morphed into the

Institute of Applied Ethics; one of the very few institutional developments to endure through the usual organisational churn. Brenda wrote widely in applied ethics and served on both the UK's Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and the Human Genetics Commission. As well as her contributions to the ethics of reproductive technologies, Brenda had a life-long interest in the philosophy and practice of education and the ethics of human relationships and family life. In her later years, the latter manifested as a spirited defence of the traditional nuclear family as the 'quintessential network of bonding.' By holding this symposium, bringing together these two issues central to Brenda's interests, the Society wishes to acknowledge the singular contribution Brenda made to the establishment and promotion of applied ethics and applied philosophy more broadly, both in the UK and internationally.

Burwood, Stephen (Hull)

Panel Papers:

Cohen, Martin (independent scholar)

Liberal Education as an Enlightenment Project

A central element of Brenda Almond's writing is education, and in particular the nature of a 'liberal education'. In several books, she examines this notion, looking particularly at it from the UK perspective and focussing on the importance of intellectual and moral freedom as it plays out in today's schools. However, this is freedom seen not merely from the point of view of an individual but also as a more subtle good embedded within a network of social relationships, starting with the family and extending throughout society. This is why Friedrich Schiller described the enrichment of personal experience as a prerequisite for existence in ever-changing circumstances and says that the understanding of self is inseparable from creative activity in the outside world. Schiller perceived that the key to both making sense of our environment and to taking an active role in shaping it, was critical thinking. Only this offered the ability to think independently and to make autonomous judgments based on rational rules and only this offered a unique path forward in education. And so, for Almond, as it was for many of the Enlightenment philosophers, not least Kant, it is this kind of thinking that needs to be at the heart of education.

Archard, David (Queens University, Belfast)

Almond and Tolstoy: Families, The Family, and the Goods of Intimate Relationships

Brenda Almond's The Fragmenting Family is a notable, if rare, philosophical defence of the 'traditional family'. Leo Tolstoy's famous opening lines of Anna Karenina suggest families which realise certain values are of the same kind, but families which go wrong vary in kind. I want to reflect on, and criticise, two ideas: first, there is no such thing as 'the family,'only 'families'; second, the family is not valuable for exclusively realising certain goods, which may also be yielded by non-familial intimate relationships. This criticism matters for being able to offer a defence of the legal protection of the family, if not for only certain forms of the family.

Millum, Joseph (St Andrews)

No Right to an Open Future

Liberals writing about the family frequently cite the child's 'right to an open future' in opposing parental decisions that might have irrevocable consequences for a child when she becomes an adult. In this talk, I argue that the 'right to an open future' has no coherent justification. Its use serves only to obscure the ethical considerations that really matter. I illustrate this claim by reference to two examples of how the 'right to an open future' has been applied: one regarding genetic testing for adult-onset disorders and one regarding selection for disabilities.

Teresa Baron (University of Nottingham)

Demands, decisions and dependencies: The future of reproduction

In the face of the 'fragmenting' nuclear family and expansions in biomedical reproductive technologies, Brenda Almond's writings call for consideration of the values that underpin both procreation and traditional family structures. Some of the principles to which she appeals will seem jarring to a liberal academic audience today; however, in this talk, I suggest that her arguments offer an important lens through which to consider some of the narratives frequently deployed in contemporary debates over assisted reproduction. Almond's defence of the nuclear family often harks back to a social context in which reproduction was closer to an inevitability than an active decision, but her resistance to the notion of individual rights in reproduction provides an important perspective from which to examine the decision to create life.